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A B S T R A C T 
This study aims to examine does independence of the Board of Commissioner (BOC) is still relevant 
as a corporate governance mechanism regarding monitoring managers’ activity, such as aggressive 
in financial reporting and tax avoidance during financial distress condition. The focus of this study is 
listed companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX), particularly on Mining and Consumer Good 
Industry sector for period 2016 until 2018. Using multiple linear regression analysis, this study 
documents that Independency of board commissioner has significant effect on manager’s activity in 
avoiding tax, however this study failed to document that independency moderates the effect of financial 
distress and financial reporting aggressiveness on tax avoidance. In addition, this study find that 
financial distress and financial re-porting aggressiveness positively affect tax avoidance. This study 
contributes on two ways, first, it adds empirical evidence regarding the relevancy of board of 
commissioner’s independency as a measure of corporate governance mechanism to monitor managers’ 
activities in avoiding tax. Second, it also adds evidence that independence is unable to moderates the 
effect of financial distress and financial reporting aggressiveness on tax avoidance activities performed 
by managers. In brief, this study implies that the independence of BoC, solely as a measure of corporate 
governance mechanism is less relevant in a current situation especially when the company facing 
financial distress conditions and managers’ aggressiveness in financial reporting. Managers should 
more pay attention to the discretion of tax avoidance activities particularly when facing financial 
distress condition. The results also imply that regulatory bodies, for instance, Stock Exchange 
Supervisory Board under the Indonesian Financial Services Authority should reconsider or 
reformation the concept of independence of Board Commissioners. 
© 2021 by the authors. Licensee SSBFNET, Istanbul, Turkey. This article is an open access article 
distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license 




Corporate governance has become crucial attention of business since Sarbanes Ox-ley’s Act in 2002 released. Indonesia, as other 
emerging countries, has regulation regarding corporate governance mechanism with regard to mitigate effect of weak shareholders 
legal protection. Arieftiara & Utama (2018), Sun et al. (2014), Gani & Jermias (2006) has ex-plored that independency of board 
commissioner (BOC) contributes on effective monitoring mechanism of managers activities significantly. Meanwhile, other 
literatures showed that independency of BOC is insufficient to measure monitoring mechanism, therefore to be more effective, 
corporate governance should be measured using more than one indicator such as competencies, BOC activities, etc. (Arieftiara et al, 
2020; Hermawan, 2011). This study investigates the relevancy of BOC’s independencies on monitoring of managers activi-ty, 
particularly in avoiding tax and aggressive in financial reporting when company faces financial distress condition.  
Tax revenue realization in State Budget (APBN) has increased from year to year, however, since 2013 from 2018 it below the target. 
From the table below, tax revenue target is increasing in 5 current years, yet the realization shows fluctuate. This fluctuation implies 
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that tax compliance behavior among tax payer is remain questioned. Santoso & Rahayu (2019) stated that tax is a wealth transfer 
from private into public sector, and tax payer, in nature, presume that tax will decrease their wealth, also according to Eisenhardt 
(1989) hu-man is bounded rationality and self-interest, therefore tax payer is performing activities that could minimize their tax 
burden.  
Table 1: Indonesian Tax Revenue Target and Realization 2013 – 2018(in Billion Rupiah) 
Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Realization 921,27 981,83 1.060,83 1.105,81 1.151,13 1.315,9 
Target 995,21 1.072.37 1.294,26 1.355,20 1.283,56 1.424 
Percentage 92,5% 91,5% 81,9% 81,59% 89,68% 92,4% 
Source: Directorate General of Taxation Performance Report, CNBC Indonesia 
Common phenomenon that still relevant nowadays is tax avoidance practice both by individual or enterprise tax payers, hence, 
analysis of tax avoidance behavior remain inter-esting to be explore further. Tax avoidance is a way to minimize tax burden by 
exploiting loopholes in taxation regulations. (Pohan, 2018 p. 11). In other words, tax avoidance is one of managers’ activities 
concerning to maximize income after tax by reducing income tax (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010); (Chen, Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin, 
2010). 
The most recent phenomenon related to Tax Avoidance in Indonesia, particularly in Mining Industry sector is the case of PT Adaro 
Energy, Tbk through its subsidiary located in Singapore. The investigation reports on allegations of tax avoidance practices performed 
by Adaro Energy are published by the International NGO Global Witness (NGO in the scope of environmental issues), it indicates 
that Adaro shift its revenue and profits abroad. The in-come shifting of Adaro causes minimize tax payments to the Government of 
Indonesia. Ac-cording to this NGO, Adaro applied transfer pricing practice by selling its mining products at a relatively lower price 
to its subsidiary in Singapore, namely Coal trade Services Interna-tional, which is then resold at higher price. Global Witness has 
found the possibility of pay-ing less than the supposed tax of USD 125 million to the Republic of Indonesia. (Tirto.id, 2019). 
Taylor & Richardson (2013) have examined corporate tax avoidance practices in Australia, the result shows that companies in 
Australia use several corporate tax avoidance practices to reduce their tax liability. They tend to use tax havens, transfer pricing, and 
capi-talization concurrently with the aim of maximizing international tax avoidance opportuni-ties.  
Investigation about the relationship between Financial Distress and Tax Avoidance Practices has previously been established, for 
instance research by (Richardson, Taylor, & Lanis, 2015) who examined the impact of financial difficulties (known as GFC/Global 
Fi-nancial Crisis) on tax avoidance, particularly it effects on the relationship between financial hardship and tax avoidance. The result 
is financial difficulties have a significant positive re-lationship with tax avoidance, confirm with this, Hanna & Haryanto (2017) have 
found that financial difficulties faced by companies also positively affect tax avoidance. On contrary, research by (Valencia, 2019) 
showed the opposite result, that is Financial Distress has no effect on Tax Avoidance. Thus, previous studies on the effect of financial 
distress condition in tax avoid-ance behavior remains unclear and need to be explore further.  
Managers’ activities in financial reporting has impact on tax avoidance, when man-ager aggressively in financial reporting it will 
cause aggressively in tax reporting as well (Shackelford & Shevlin, 2005; Suharti & Arieftiara, 2019; Frank et al., 2009; Yunistina 
& Tahar, 2017). These studies showed that there is a trade-off between income reported in the financial statements to the shareholders 
and to the tax authority. Shareholders demand max-imum income reported by managers on financial statement, on the other side it 
will cause maximum income for tax computation based as well, which is undesirable by shareholders. However, recent research 
shows that there is not always a trade off in financial reporting and tax reporting (Hanna and Haryanto (2017). (Frank, Lynch, & 
Rego, 2009) developed a study that comprehensively explains the relationship between tax aggressive actions and financial reporting 
aggressiveness. (Frank et al., 2009) found that companies with higher profits re-ported in their financial statements had a relatively 
small tax burden, which context in Unit-ed States. Frank et al (2009) measured tax avoidance with Book Tax Difference or the differ-
ence between profit in financial statements and increasing taxable income. This further strengthens the argument that differences in 
financial accounting and taxation rules are able to provide opportunities for companies to manage larger book-based revenues and 
lower tax-able income in the same reporting period. From the explanation above, the relationship be-tween financial reporting 
aggressiveness and tax avoidance remain unclear, hence needs to be explored further.  
As mentioned before, mainly in emerging countries, Corporate Governance is need to ascertain that managers’ activities are 
concerning align with shareholders’ interest. The mon-itoring mechanism from corporate governance system will mitigates potential 
risk/disadvantages rise from opportunistic behaviors of managers such as in financial report-ing aggressiveness and tax avoidance 
(Arieftiara et al., 2020; Suharti & Arieftiara, 2019; Armstrong et al., 2015). The ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard ranking 
obtained by Indonesia this year is getting better. This shows the improvement in Indonesian issuers in the ranks of public companies 
in ASEAN. The ACGS rating is corporate governance assessment of 100 stock-emittens with the largest market capitalization. 
Companies will be more com-ply to accounting principles and tax regulations if the corporate governance mechanism is well 
implemented, such as how the independency of Board of Commissioners. (www.invest.kontan.co.id). 
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Previous study documented that independent commissioners on the composition of the board of commissioners positively impact on 
tax avoidance activities (Lanis & Richard-son, 2011). However, this study focuses to investigates Does the BOC’s independency as 
an indicator of corporate governance mechanism still relevance, primarily in monitors manag-ers’ activities regarding financial 
reporting aggressiveness and tax avoidance when compa-nies facing financial distress condition? This study contributes on two ways, 
first, it adds empirical evidence regarding the relevancy of board of commissioner’s independency as a measure of corporate 
governance mechanism to monitor managers’ activities in avoiding tax. Second, it also adds evidence that independency unable to 
moderates the effect of finan-cial distress and financial reporting aggressiveness on tax avoidance activities performed by managers. 
In brief, this study implies that independency of BoC, solely as a measure of cor-porate governance mechanism is less relevant in 
current situation especially when company facing financial distress condition and managers’ aggressiveness in financial reporting. 
Literature Review 
Theoretical and Conceptual Background 
Board of commissioners’ monitoring mechanism based on agency theory and signal theory 
Agency theory, developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976, explained that firm is consist nexus of contract which potential caused 
problem, namely Agency Problem between principal and agent. The difference in interests between those parties will cause Agency 
Cost beared by principals, therefore they should implement the monitoring mechanism toward agent. There are three models in 
Agency cost, first, monitoring cost, which is the cost that the principal incurs, which aims to observe and control all agent behavior 
in managing the company. The second is Bonding cost, which is the cost made by the principal to ensure that the actions of the agent 
are in the interests of the principal. The third is the residual cost, which is a cost that has been incurred but does not have an effect 
on what is wanted or it can also be called a decrease in the Principal's welfare (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The information asymmetry arises because the agent has more information than prin-cipal, and it used by agent to avoid tax in order 
to fulfill its interests (Scott, 2015). For ex-ample, to gain maximum after-tax compensation, which determined based on the financial 
performance condition in one period, so that the agent will make every effort mainly with purpose to maintain the company's good 
financial condition, in order to be compensated higher, hence the agent will avoid tax aggressively.  
Signal Theory which developed by Ross (1977) stated that a company through man-agement as an agent has a "signal", which is 
company try to release significant information to interested parties, such as investors and business people. This signal emerges from 
the presence of information asymmetry within internal and external parties, the signal is the management's belief that qualitatively, 
that is completer and more reliable than the pub-lished version of financial reporting 
Tax Avoidance  
Tax Planning is one method of tax management, performed by managers to obtain optimum tax burden, with two ways, tax evasion 
and tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is man-agers activities to minimize tax burden and taxable income by exploit loopholes in the tax 
law, then it also called as legal activities and does not violate the law, meanwhile tax evasion is managers’ effort to resistance tax 
payment illegally, by violating applicable laws and regu-lations, such as manipulating income statements, etc (Hanlon & Heitzman, 
2010; Richard-son, 2015; Pohan, 2018; Santoso & Rahayu, 2019; Arieftiara et al., 2020). Even though tax planning is a legal action, 
managers should not aggressively in avoiding tax, since it will po-tentially cause tax penalties and can be harmful for the good image 
of the company (Yoonah, 2006). 
According to Prebble et al., (2012), tax avoidance is different from tax evasion in the way of its method. Tax avoidance is arrangement 
of transactions that has tax favored by tak-ing advantage of the opportunities that exist in tax regulations and not against these regula-
tions, meanwhile, tax evasion is an act which is performed intentionally in an illegal sense with the same objective to evade tax 
payment 
Financial Distress 
In general, bankruptcy is a condition in which a company unable to fulfill its obliga-tions which lead to legal process related to 
bankruptcy, either recovery or liquidation. Bank-ruptcy initially emerge from the financial condition then followed by the occurrence 
of legal process toward bankrupt. Disruption occurs in the company's business process in responding to internal and external 
conditions as a trigger of bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). 
This study uses the terminology of financial distress based on previous studies where the definition of financial distress is a sign that 
can lead a company to bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). The measures of financial distress are also recognized as ratio to predict 
bankruptcy (Altman, 1968). 
Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 
Aggressiveness of Financial Reporting is defined as a managers’ activity which pur-poses to increase net income by using several 
ways including earning management (Frank et al., 2009). Earnings management is a method of income and accruals recognition in 
accord-ance with accounting standards that also needs discretion from management to implement.  Thus, managers could aggressively 
using their discretion regarding earning management by making an aggressive financial reporting.  
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Managers have various motivation of reporting the financial statement aggressively, such as to gain good impression from 
shareholders and to maintain higher stock prices. Fi-nancial reporting aggressiveness occurs when managers use their discretion in 
preparing fi-nancial reports and manipulate information in financial reports. According to definitions above, it can be concluded that 
the aggressiveness of financial reporting is related to earn-ings management activities, whether manipulative or not, in accordance 
with generally ac-cepted accounting principles or not, in order to avoid various risks that can harm the compa-ny such as deteriorating 
reputation and decreasing prices (Suharti & Arieftiara, 2019). 
Independency of Board of Commissioner  
The Authority of Financial Services (OJK) has regulated the board of commissioners and board of directors of public companies 
under regulation number 33 of 2014. The respon-sibility and role of the board of commissioners is emphasized in the principle of 
GCG ac-cording to the "Organization for Economic Corporation and Development/OECD", namely the responsibility of the board, 
which means this principle emphasizes the importance of the function of the board of commissioners as an advisor to management 
in managing the com-pany. The board of commissioners must treat all shareholders fairly and without discrimina-tion. In addition, 
the board of commissioners also functions to manage conflicts of interest and maintain company transparency and accountability. 
The composition of the board of commissioners is generally divided into independent and ordinary members. Independent 
commissioner is a commissioner who is generally inde-pendent, which means that he has no interest or affiliation in a company, such 
as share own-ership or concurrent positions. According to OJK Regulation Number 33 / POJK.04 / 2014, the number of independent 
commissioners on the board of commissioners of a company or issuer is at least 30% of the total number of commissioners.  
Hypothesis Development 
Edwards et al. (2012) found that companies experiencing financial difficulties will encounter declined fund resources mainly from 
external parties, increased capital costs, and lower credit ratings. In this condition managers will take various strategies to keep the 
busi-ness running by maintain firm’s liquidity through tax avoidance. Tax avoidance is become an option taken by managers even 
though it can potentially cause risk to the company. Chen, et al. (2010) and Richardson, et al. (2015) found that the intensity of tax 
avoidance activities is increasing when companies experience financial distress. The purpose of tax avoidance is to saving tax 
payment, so that company can allocate its cash to the creditors which can main-tain its credit rating and it will eventually generate 
capital to funding its operations (Brondo-lo, 2009).  
H1: Financial distress positively affects on tax avoidance. 
Mulyadi & Anwar (2015) examined the effect of corporate governance and financial reporting aggressiveness on tax management 
with assuming that company managers will im-plement aggressiveness in financial reporting to minimize corporate tax liabilities. 
Managers who have more information than outsiders are performing tax avoidance by utilizing loop-holes in the tax regulation, so 
that it categorized as legal action. Consistent with Mulyadi & Anwar (2015), Suharti & Arieftiara (2019) also found that to 
counterbalance their activity in financial reporting aggressiveness, managers also increase the intensity of tax avoidance ac-tivities. 
Thereby, managers could ascertain that aggressiveness financial reporting will not increase tax payment. 
Empirical evidence from United States showed that large book-tax difference which is the difference between earnings reported in 
the financial statements and taxable income indicates that companies aggressive in financial reporting and avoiding tax at once 
(Manzon, Jr. & Plesko, 2005). Consistent with this, Lisowsky (2010) also supports by examining the existence of tax sheltering 
through information in company financial reports. Meanwhile, Frank et al. (2009) have explained comprehensively that there is 
relationship between tax avoidance and financial reporting aggressiveness. In Indonesia context, Suharti & Arieftiara (2019) found 
financial reporting aggressiveness has a positive effect on tax avoidance. 
H2 = Financial Reporting Aggressiveness positively affect tax avoidance. 
Lanis & Richardson (2011) found the effect of the board of directors on tax avoid-ance. The study found that independent boards of 
commissioners decrease tax aggressive ac-tion. (Taylor & Richardson, 2013) also documented the existence of corporate governance 
able to decrease aggressiveness in taxation. Tax avoidance is gray in nature so it is necessary to implement corporate governance to 
reduce the risk of being sanctioned by the company, that is monitoring from BOC’s independence. 
Financial distress condition can trigger manager to take strategic action to keep the company survive, minimizing tax payment will 
save its liquidity (Chou, Li, & Yin, 2010). In Addition, Chou et.al. (2010) found that when company facing financial distress 
condition, monitoring from BOC will ensure manager to take the right action in order to prevent it from bankrupt, and will ensure 
that managers’ tax avoidance activity does not induce more risk to company. Independency of BOC will strengthen the quality of 
corporate governance mecha-nism, this will also make the intensity of tax avoidance activity lower especially when com-pany facing 
financial distress condition. The board of commissioners as independent parties will ensure that the company is able to fulfill its 
financial obligations. Thus, in a financial difficult condition, the board of commissioners will give more attention to the company's 
going concern aspect by monitor the managers to lower their intensity in avoiding, so it could not harm the company 
Independent member of board of commissioners tends to minimize the level of cor-porate tax avoidance practices because tax 
avoidance practices induce large marginal costs (Armstrong, Blouin, Jagolinzer, & Larcker, 2015). Several previous studies have 
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investigated board of commissioners as moderating variable and give evidence of the board of commis-sioners’ existence as part of 
the company's governance mechanism (Wisnuwardhana & Di-yanty, 2015; Savitri, 2019). 
H3 = The independence of the Board of Commissioners moderates the effect of financial distress toward tax avoidance 
The existence of independence member can lower the possibility of opportunistic be-havior of managers, that is action or decision 
according to managers’ interest, such as ag-gressiveness in financial reporting. The board of commissioners monitors and control the 
firms’ management process. Companies that have optimal level of independence BOC’s member are expected to be able to decrease 
agency problems, such as aggressiveness in fi-nancial reporting and tax avoidance (Taylor & Richardson, 2013). 
H4 = Independence of the Board of Commissioners moderates the effect of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness toward Tax 
Avoidance 
Research and Methodology 
This study focuses on consumer goods and mining industry sector companies listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) during 
2016 to 2018. This study aims to determine the relevancy of independent BOC in corporate monitoring; besides that, this study aims 
to investigates effect of financial distress and financial reporting aggressiveness on tax avoidance with the independence of the board 
of commissioners as a moderation variable. We used purposive sampling technique and total final sample is 147 firm years. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
Empirical Model 
Based on literature reviews and problem identification above, the empirical model to test four hypothesis is as follows: 
𝐵𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑜𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑖𝑡 ∗  𝐵𝑜𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡     
 
Data analysis technique using multiple linear regression and expected results from this study ware 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are expected to be 
positive,  𝛽3 is expected to be negative and  𝛽4 is expected to be not equal to 0 (𝛽1 ≠ 0), all is expected to be significant. 
 Richardson et al. (2015) defines tax avoidance as manager’s action to reduce taxable profit through tax planning. Based on Guenther 
(2018), tax avoidance is measured using Book-Tax Differences (BTD). The gaps or differences between reported Income per Book 
and Tax or Book-Tax Differences BTD which looks at the difference from income according to accounting (book income) and taxable 
income according to taxation provisions (Guenther, 2018) Income according to accounting (book income) is defined as accounting 
profit before tax or Earnings Before Tax (EBT). Because data on taxable income, it is difficult to obtain income according to tax in 
this study using current tax expense divided by 25% (tax rate in Indonesia).  










BTD value indicates to the extend tax avoidance of company, the higher value of BTD means that the higher tax avoidance of 
company. Arieftiara et al. (2020) stated that BTD brings more objective and relevant measure of manager’s activity in tax avoidance 
rather than Effective Tax Rate (ETR). 
Financial Distress is a financial difficulties condition faced by the company as a result of economics distress and poor management 
action (Whitaker, 1999). Firstly, company who facing financial distress, experience declining in financial performance compares to 
previous period of time, and this condition may be triggered by bad economic condition or economic distress. Secondly, company 
will have experience of declining in operating income as a result of poor management action. This research used Springate Model to 
measure firms’ financial distress level, as follows:  


















Based on Prihanthini & Sari (2013), cut-off point of Springate Model is FD > 0,862 which means company who has score above 
0,862 is categorized as lower potential occurs bankruptcy. Meanwhile, a company who has Springate Model score < 0,862 will be 
categorized as higher potential occurs bankruptcy company.  
Financial Reporting Aggressivity (FRA) is one of earnings management activity to increase income reported on the financial 
statement with accommodate accounting policies (Frank et al., 2009). Modified Jones Model used to measure the Financial Reporting 
Aggressivity, based on (Suharti & Arieftiara, 2019), financial reporting aggressiveness is captured by the discretionary accrual, which 
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Independent Board of Commissioner (BoC) is used as moderating variable, which proxied by board’s effectiveness scoring based on 
Hermawan (2009). The effectiveness scoring comprises of 5 indicators, such as: (1) numbers of independent members in BoC; (2) 
status independency of BoC Chairman; (3) definition of independency stated on the annual report; (4) BoC ownership on affiliation 
entities; and (5) existence of remuneration committee. Every item of these indicators would be maximum 3 and minimum 1, company 
will have score 3 (good) if the information is clearly stated in the annual report and tend to beyond the basic requirement of effective 
board monitoring activity; score 2 (fair) if the information is not too clear; and score 1 (poor) if the information regarding effectiveness 
indicator can’t be found in the annual report. 
Result and Discussion  
Data used in this research is consumer goods industry and mining during 2016 to 2018. The aim of this study was to determine the 
Effect of Financial Distress and Aggres-siveness of Financial Reporting on Tax Avoidance with the Independence of the Board of 
Commissioners as a Moderation variable, where in this study the purposive technique was used. The final data is 147 firm years of 
observation. Data met the requirement for normality test and classic assumption test 
From Table 2 the description of observation shown that in general, mean value of book-tax difference was -0.0117 indicated that 
book income reported by the company is lower than taxable income for about 1.17 % relative to total assets. This means that in gen-
eral, companies tend to defer income recognition but according to tax-based companies should report income higher than accounting-
based. This could be an indication that manag-er did some effort to make income decreasing reporting in order to lower income base 
for tax computation. Meanwhile for financial distress condition, observation shown that in general companies have 1.4709 mean 
score for Financial Distress (FD), it means that overall compa-nies are experiencing lower probability to bankruptcy. Table 2 also 
shown that mean score of financial reporting aggressiveness was -0.0387, which means that in general, companies in-curred lower 
earnings or income decreasing earnings management. This is according to Kaszink (1999) stated that firms with lower earnings are 
likely to exhibit negative discre-tionary accruals. In general, companies had effective monitoring from independent board of 
commissioners since the value of BoC variable is 0.7845 which this value is near to 1, and data shown that the minimum score for 
Board’s monitoring effectiveness is above 0.5 or above moderate level:  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Observation Max Min Mean Std. Deviation 
BTD 147 0.04 -0.08 -0.0117 0.0236 
FD 147 4.54 0.02 1.4709 0.9628 
FRA 147 1.55 -1.52 -0.0387 0.5327 
BoC 147 1.00 0.60 0.7845 0.0799 
Where: 
BTD    = Book-Tax Differences, indicator for Tax avoidance activities 
FD       = Financial Distress 
FRA    = Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 
BoC    = The effectiveness of Board of Commissioners monitoring 
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The result of hypotheses testing is showed in Table 3. Hypothesis 1 was supported by the data, it means that financial distress positive 
significantly affects tax avoidance. Hypoth-esis 2 was supported by the data which means that financial reporting aggressiveness 
positive significantly affects tax avoidance. From Table 3, the result shown that the effectiveness of BoC’s monitoring did not have 
moderating effect on financial distress and financial report-ing aggressiveness on tax avoidance. 
Table 3: Summary of Hypotheses Testing Result 
𝑩𝑻𝑫𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟏 𝑭𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟐 𝑭𝑹𝑨𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑭𝑫𝒊𝒕 ∗  𝑩𝒐𝑪𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑭𝑹𝑨𝒊𝒕 ∗  𝑩𝒐𝑪𝒊𝒕 +  𝒆𝒊𝒕    (1) 
 
Variables Predicted  
Sign 
Coef t p-value 
Constanta  -0.012 -6.331 0,000*** 
FD H1: + 0.005 2.331 0,021** 
FRA H2: + 0.012 3.059 0,003*** 
FD*BoC H3: - 0.000 -0.016 0,987 
FRA*BoC H4: +/- 0.002 -0.040 0,968 
Fstat 4.317     
Prob f-stat 0.001    
RSquare 0.133    
N 147    
Where: 
BTD    = Book-Tax Differences, indicator for Tax avoidance activities 
FD       = Financial Distress 
FRA    = Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 
BoC    = The effectiveness of Board of Commissioners monitoring 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
 
The Effect of Financial Distress on Tax Avoidance Activities 
The result of this research supported the hypotheses that financial distress and financial reporting aggressiveness were positive 
significantly affect tax avoidance activity. The first hypothesis of this study was that financial distress had a positive effect on tax 
avoidance, this supports the results of Richardson et al. (2015). This happens because, the greater the financial distress experienced 
by the company, the more the company will do tax avoidance, the additional marginal benefits derived from tax avoidance are greater 
than the costs incurred due to tax avoidance. In addition, when companies face higher financial distress, access to sources of funds 
from outside the company is increasingly limited, so they will face reduced sources of funding from external parties, increased costs 
of capital, low credit ratings, and more risks taken by managers can change management views about tax avoidance. Under these 
conditions, the company will act to avoiding tax (Brondolo, 2009) in order to save tax costs. 
Companies that are stuck in Financial Distress, trying to keep their companies survive, inevitably take more risks, and are more 
aggressive in tax avoidance as the need for cash is increasingly critical, and must make tax savings, especially if the company's tax 
burden is the main thing in cash outflows. They will rule out the possibility of a negative reputation gained from aggressively tax 
evasion. 
According to (Edwards et al., 2012) Companies experiencing financial difficulties tend to avoid tax in order to increase marginal 
benefits and cover marginal costs. The marginal benefits include reducing tax obligations, increasing cash flow, maintaining a good 
credit rating, and making assumptions about the company's sustainability. Meanwhile, the marginal costs referred to here such as 
burdens and litigation, penalties, and reputational losses that will be received. 
The Effect of Financial Reporting Aggressiveness on Tax Avoidance Activities 
This study proves that there is often a trade-off between aggressiveness of financial reporting and tax avoidance. Managers always 
face the shareholders interest that the company is able to report relatively larger profits in the financial statements, and at the same 
time the company also has a lower tax burden to pay. This is supported by the fact that companies in the United States show that 
there is a Book Tax Difference or the difference between profit in financial statements and taxable income that is getting bigger 
(Manzon, Jr. & Plesko, 2005). 
This positive relationship is in line with previous predictions that there is a tendency for managers to be able to report higher profits 
and at the same time have a lower tax burden than they should. This is in line with research by (Frank et al, 2009) in the United 
States, then re-examined by (Ledewara, et. al, 2020) on manufacturing companies in Indonesia, which shown a positive relationship 
between aggressiveness of financial reporting and tax avoidance by companies. 
The Moderation Effect of the Board of Commissioners Monitoring on the relationship between Financial Distress and Financial 
Reporting Aggressiveness on Tax Avoidance 
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In this study, the role of corporate governance is not only assessed in terms of its independence, but is measured from the effectiveness 
of the independent board of commissioners, which is not only assessed from independence but also from board’s competencies, 
activities and others in a whole. 
The presence of board of commissioners monitoring did not have effect on the relationship between bankruptcy risk and 
aggressiveness of financial reporting toward corporate tax avoidance, so hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported. The results of this 
study are in line with several studies conducted in Indonesia. According to Ridha & Martani, (2014) in his research said that in 
Indonesia the implementation of corporate governance was not optimal, this resulted in no matter how big the GCG score was, it did 
not guarantee that corporate governance was going well. 
Astuti & Yuniarto, (2019) said that the independence of the board of commissioners did not have significant relationship with 
financial problems in the company, in line with (Pradipta & Supriyadi, 2015), that independent commissioners have no effect on tax 
avoidance. The Independent Commissioners in the company have not been able to carry out their supervisory functions optimally in 
accordance with the laws and regulations and the lack of control over employees, making it easy to take tax avoidance actions. 
Conclusions  
From the results we can imply that (i) managers should pay attention more to the financial health condition of the company, since it 
will cause inclination of tax avoidance activities, which is it can eventually affect corporate’s reputation toward shareholders, 
creditors or other external stakeholders; (ii) regulator, especially the Financial Services Authority should reconsider or reformulation 
the concept of independence of Board Commissioners, in terms of the real function or contribution in order to monitor managers 
activities on tax avoidance particularly when managers aggressively in financial reporting and company facing financial distress 
condition as well.  
This research concludes the following points: 
i. Financial distress has positive and significant effect on tax avoidance.  
ii. Financial reporting aggressiveness has positive and significant effect on tax avoidance.  
iii. The result failed to documented that the independence of the board of commissioners have moderation effect on the 
relationship between financial distress and tax avoidance  
iv. The result failed to documented that the independence of the board of commissioners have moderation effect on the 
relationship between financial distress and tax avoidance, nor to the relationship between Financial Reporting 
Aggressiveness and tax avoidance 
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